Neuroimaging faces the daunting challenge of multiple testing -an instance of multiplicity -that is associated with 9 two other issues to some extent: low inference efficiency and poor reproducibility. Typically, the same statistical model is 10 applied to each spatial unit independently in the approach of massively univariate modeling. In dealing with multiplicity, 11 the general strategy employed in the field is the same regardless of the specifics: trust the local "unbiased" effect estimates 12 while adjusting the extent of statistical evidence at the global level. However, in this approach, modeling efficiency is 13 compromised because each spatial unit (e.g., voxel, region, matrix element) is treated as an isolated and independent 14 entity during massively univariate modeling. In addition, the required step of multiple testing "correction" by taking 15 into consideration spatial relatedness, or neighborhood leverage, can only partly recoup statistical efficiency, resulting in 16 potentially excessive penalization as well as arbitrariness due to thresholding procedures. Moreover, the assigned statistical 17 evidence at the global level heavily relies on the data space (whole brain or a small volume). The present paper reviews how 18 Stein's paradox (1956) motivates a Bayesian multilevel (BML) approach that, rather than fighting multiplicity, embraces 19 it to our advantage through a global calibration process among spatial units. Global calibration is accomplished via a 20 Gaussian distribution for the cross-region effects whose properties are not a priori specified, but a posteriori determined by 21 the data at hand through the BML model. Our framework therefore incorporates multiplicity as integral to the modeling 22 structure, not a separate correction step. By turning multiplicity into a strength, we aim to achieve five goals: 1) improve 23 model efficiency with higher predictive accuracy, 2) control the errors of incorrect magnitude and incorrect sign, 3) validate 24 each model relative to competing candidates, 4) reduce the reliance and sensitivity on the choice of data space, and 5) 25 encourage full results reporting. Our modeling proposal reverberates with recent proposals to eliminate the dichotomization 26 of statistical evidence ("significant" vs. "non-significant"), to improve the interpretability of study findings, as well as to 27 promote reporting the full gamut of results (not only "significant" ones), thereby enhancing research transparency and 28 reproducibility. 29
Fighting or Embracing Multiplicity in Neuroimaging?
The process is illustrated by considering three hypothetical spatial clusters that can be imagined as three sub-continental landmasses. The "pass" or "fail" of a cluster depends on its size (cross-section extent) at a particular voxel-wise threshold (or sea level; showcased by the blue segment length). In other words, only the neighborhood defined by that particular threshold matters in the sense that the spatiotemporal information contained in the data is summarized by a snapshot (a cluster defined by a cutoff). At the level of t1, clusters A and B survive (green "+" sign) based on the spatial threshold T1 while C does not (red "×" sign) because of its small size. In contrast, at the stringent level t3, both clusters A and B fail while C survives. Note that the surviving clusters strongly depend on the "sea level" adopted, and no single case is ideal. In particular, if an anatomical region is intrinsically small, clustering will often fail to reveal it unless the statistical evidence is unusually strong.
(A) Prediction with no pooling: top 50 players 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55Here, we pretend that we could time-travel to the future and take a sneak peek at the independent shooting rates yi of the players, which are assumed to follow a Gaussian distribution: y1, y2, .., y50
iid ∼ N (my, σ 2 y ) (here, my = 0.4, σy = 0.1). Kevin Durant's data point is labeled as "LBJ". (A) Simple scheme in which future performance of the top 50 players is predicted (values represented by squares) to be the same as in the current year (circles). The actual "future" values are also shown (diamonds). The purple dash lines link the predicted and actual future values. (B) The performance of the top 50 players is predicted through simple regression. The slanted green lines, corresponding to the green fitted line in (C), illustrate partial pooling, which interestingly also corresponds to the concept of regression to the mean established by Francis Galton. For the hypothetical dataset at hand, note that the prediction of the next season for Durant as one of the top 50 players is 49.0%, a value that is slightly downgraded from his current 52.1%. (C) Two scenarios are contrasted for the top 50 players. First, the same as in panel (A): using each player's current performance to predict future values gives the diagonal line fit x = y (red line). Second, we could imagine having future data and predicting future yi values with the current data xi as an explanatory variable. In this case, the ordinary least squares solution (green line) would produce a fitted line shallower than the diagonal (dotted red line), which illustrates the partial pooling effect (see, Stigler 1990). (D) What would happen if we predicted the performance of the top 50 players as part of a bigger pool of the top 100 players? The effect of partial pooling remains evident by the shallower line of regression fit (sold blue line). Although the prediction of the top 50 players as part of the top 100 players is different from that limited to the top 50 players (dashed green line, same as the solid green line in panel C), the prediction difference is relatively small due to the adaptive nature of the Gaussian distribution assumed for the data.
performance is uniformly distributed. That is to say, all possible values are credible, including very low (e.g., 10%) and 206 very high (e.g., 90%) shooting rates, which are actually not observed in practice.
207
It is instructive to consider the problem of simultaneously predicting the performance of the set of 50 players as a 208 type of multiplicity problem. In this case, it is not only the individual accuracy (cf. voxel-wise p-value under NHST) 209 that matters the most, but the overall accuracy (cf. overall FPR) that is of concern. As stated, one approach is to treat 210 each player as independent from the rest, similar to the massively univariate approach in neuroimaging ( Fig. 2A ). As 211 players do not simply repeat their performance, the observed future performance (generated hypothetically) will deviate 212 from the preceding season to some extent (as indicated by the purple lines connecting squares to diamonds in Fig. 2A ). 213 We go through this exercise again but now pretend that we could time-travel to the future and take a sneak peek at the 214 independent shooting rates y i of the top 50 NBA players. If we predicted players' future performance based on current 215 performance via linear regression, we would obtain the fit displayed in Fig. 2C (green line). The same data as used in Fig. 
216
2A were employed, which was generated based on the assumption that future shooting rates follow a Gaussian distribution.
217
If we plot the linear regression predictions in a manner that follows that of Fig. 2A , we can see that the predicted values 218 differ from the current one, as can be seen by the slanted green lines in Fig. 2B . The role of the Gaussian distribution 219 assumption of future performance can be visualized as a sort of elastic band, whereby predictions are mutually informative.
220
Notably, predictions for outlying players (high and low scorers) are shrunk toward the group mean via the implicit partial 221 pooling of the procedure.
222
In the present case, our willingness to apply prior knowledge (that shooting percentages typically follow a Gaussian 223 distribution) transformed the problem into a simple GLM system, thereby achieving a higher overall accuracy in Fig. 2B 224 (see the comparison between the two sums of squared residuals) than that with the assumption of no prior knowledge 225 (represented by a uniform distribution) in Fig. 2A . Notably, the prior information (i.e., the distribution assumption) only 226 sets the general shape while the specifics of the shape (i.e., mean and variance) can be determined from actual data through 227 the model (and estimated via ordinary least squares, or maximum likelihood). Thus, partial pooling is adaptive in the sense 228 that information about centrality and spread of the players' performances is not required as part of the prior information, 229 but is determined from the data. The adaptivity of the Gaussian prior can be further illustrated as follows. The prediction 230 for the top 50 players through regression is different when they are considered as a subset of the top 100 players. However, 231 the difference due to the addition of the 51th-100th players is relatively small (Fig. 2D ).
232
Case study 2: dealing with epidemiological data of kidney cancer 233 An example conceptually closer to the situation in neuroimaging involves epidemiological survey data regarding the 234 highest and lowest cancer rates across the United States ( Fig. 3 ). Examination of the map indicates that the highest kidney 235 cancer rates were observed in relatively sparsely populated regions of the country (Fig. 3A) . One then might be tempted 236 to infer that geographical factors explain the high rates, such as restricted access to healthcare, low utility infrastructure, 237 or higher doses of radiation. But it is difficult to reconcile these explanations with the observation that counties with the 238 lowest kidney cancer death rates also tend to be less populated ( Fig. 3B) . A more parsimonious explanation of the data, 239 which is consistent with both maps, is based on the small sample size of rural counties, combined with the relatively low 240 mortality rate due to kidney cancer (which is a rare disease). To see this, suppose that the national average death rate is 241 around 1 per 2,000 people (per 10 years). In a county with a population of about 1,000 people, one can imagine observing 242 zero or one deaths by chance alone, which would place the county into the map with the lowest or highest rate, respectively.
243
So, based on the survey data, how should we make reasonable inferences about all the individual counties? Two 244 questions can be posed: 1) Should we really believe that a resident in a specific county has a higher (or lower) probability 245 of dying of kidney cancer than the national average? 2) Can we infer that a resident in a county in That is, would we be able to confidently recommend that someone move from a county in 
250
The epidemiological distribution of kidney cancer deaths can be seen as involving a multiplicity problem over the several 251 thousands of districts. A natural solution might be to borrow the idea of neighborhood leverage in neuroimaging (that is, 252 spatial clustering), and to utilize the relatedness among adjacent counties to modulate the statistical evidence for clusters 253 of counties. Note, however, that this leveraging approach only adjusts the extent of statistical evidence, and it does not 254 modify the death rate estimates themselves (at county or cluster level). In other words, the conventional neuroimaging . The power (shaded in blue) is the total area of the t20 distribution for the true effect (black curve) beyond these thresholds, which is 0.10 (A) or 0.06 (B). The type S error is the ratio of the blue area in the true effect distribution's left tail beyond the threshold of -2.09 to the total area of both tails, which is 4% (A) or 21% (B) (i.e., the ratio of the "statistically significant" area in the wrong-signed tail to that of the total "statistically significant" area). If a random draw from the t20 distribution under the true effect happens to be 2.2 (small gray square), it would be identified as statistically significant at the 0.05 level, and the resulting type M error would quantify the magnification of the estimated effect size as 2.2/0.7 ≈ 3.1 (A) or 2.2/0.3 ≈ 7.3 (B), which is substantially larger than unity. These two plots aptly demonstrate the importance of controlling the errors of incorrect sign and incorrect magnitude when a large amount of variability exists in the data. High variance is bound to occur when we deal with the multiplicity issue embedded with massively univariate modeling, which is further exacerbated by scenarios such as small sample size, noisy data, unaccounted for cross-subjects variability and suboptimal alignment to a standard template. More systematic exploration and comparison between the conventional (type I and type II) and the new (type S and type M) sets of errors can be found in Gelman and Tuerlinckx (2000) and Chen et al. (2019b).
approach to handling multiplicity does not address two types of estimation errors that are important to consider (Gelman 256 and Tuerlinckx, 2000). One is the so-called type M error, which refers to a potential over-or under-estimation of the effect 257 magnitude. The second is the so-called type S error, which refers to getting the sign of a comparison wrong (does county 258 A have a higher or lower death rate than county B?). A potential solution is to employ a methodology that prevents the 259 estimation process from being swayed by larger fluctuations.
260
Consideration of Stein's paradox in the context of the kidney cancer case suggests potential strategies to address the 261 multiplicity issue. One possibility is to not place trust only in isolated bits of survey data (at the county level), but instead 262 to incorporate all counties into a Bayesian model with a hierarchical structure that leverages death rate information shooting rate; or, in the cancer case, the death rate at one specific county) to the overall predictive accuracy among all effects (overall accuracy among all the 50 players or among all US counties).
273
BML: trading off bias against predictive accuracy 274 To recapitulate, a fundamental difference between the conventional, isolated modeling approach and the integrative BML 275 method is that the former seeks statistical unbiasedness at each spatial unit, while accepting a daunting FPR problem that 276 requires corrective procedures. Having an unbiased estimator (the quintessential example is probably the sample mean as 277 an estimate of the population mean) may sound appealing, but it is not always the most desirable property, as recognized 278 by statisticians and applied scientists for some time. This is especially the case when sample size is not large or when noise to the estimated regression coefficients in addition to minimizing residuals (e.g., the LASSO attempts to keep the overall 293 "budget" of weights under a certain value: j |β j | ≤ k). It is also interesting to note that global calibration is employed 294 in meta analysis (Glass, 1976) . When summarizing multiple studies of an effect, there is no correction for multiplicity of 295 statistical evidence, but instead effects are weighted based on their respective relative reliability.
296
Some properties of the BML to be described further below include the following. First, the multiplicity issue is 297 automatically dissolved given that a single model is employed -there is no "multiple" to correct! In addition to being If the data renders a t20 value of 2.85 (small gray square), reaching the comfort zone (green or yellow area) with a two-tailed p-value of 0.01 (the probability of obtaining such data with a t20 value at least as extreme if the effect were truly zero), one may declare to have strong evidence for the effect with an FPR threshold of 0.05 under the NHST framework. In contrast, inferences under the Bayesian framework directly address the research interest (right curve): what is the probability of the effect magnitude being greater than 0 with the data at hand (greater than 0.99 in this case)? There are different ways to provide a point estimate of centrality from the posterior distribution such as mean, median and mode (or maximum a posteriori probability (MAP)) under the Bayesian framework, while such point estimates are usually the same due to symmetry under the theoretical distribution of NHST. However, Bayesian inferences tend to emphasize more the uncertainty of an effect, not its point estimate. The green and yellow tails of the posterior density mark the extent of statistical evidence associated with the two specific (two-sided 95% and 90%) uncertainty intervals, and the dotted dark green line shows the median or 50% quantile of the posterior density. Notice 1) the x-axis is different between the two densities (standardized value for NHST and effect in physical dimension for Bayesian paradigm), 2) P (data | zero effect) under NHST is conceptually and numerically most of the time not the same as 1 − P (effect > or < 0 | data) under the Bayesian framework, 3) the null distribution under NHST has a smooth and regular shape due to the assumption of a standard curve in the model as a prior while the irregular posterior distribution is formulated through random samples through Markov chain Monte Carlo simulations under Bayesian framework, and 4) compared to the conventional confidence interval that is flat and inconvenient to interpret, the posterior density provides much richer information such as spread, shape and skewness.
The Bayesian framework aims to answer a different, though, related question: What is the probability of a research 321 hypothesis H R based on the observed data, P (H R | data)? Note the difference in what is being "measured" and what is 322 "given" in this proposition, as opposed to the preceding NHST case. Such a probability can be computed by using Bayes' 323 rule (Kruschke, 2010). In a typical setting the research hypothesis H R refers to an effect or parameter θ (e.g., "population 324 mean") being positive or negative (e.g., H R : θ > 0). An attractive property of this framework is that it is not typically 325 formulated to generate a binary decision ("real effect" vs. "noise", or "significant" vs. "not significant") but instead to 326 obtain the entire probability density distribution associated with P (θ | data) ( Fig. 5, right) . This posterior distribution is 327 interpreted in a natural way even though it may take getting used to for those who are unfamiliar with Bayesian inferences.
328
For example, P (0.1 < θ < 0.2 | data) is the area under the curve within the effect interval (0.1, 0.2). For convenience, one 329 can also indicate "tail probabilities" associated with values commonly used in the literature. For example, the two-sided 330 area indicated in green is 0.05 and the two-sided area indicated in yellow-plus-green is 0.1; these would be analogous to 331 95% and 90% confidence intervals, respectively, in the NHST framework. Here, we see that the value θ = 0 lies inside the 332 left green tail; thus, the probability that the parameter exceeds zero is P (θ > 0 | data) = 0.99. One can then use the 333 probability in question to emphasize or summarize the extent (e.g., "strong", "moderate", "weak", or "little") of statistical 334 evidence. However, we stress that the goal is to quantify and qualify the evidence, not to make a binary decision in terms 335 of "passes threshold" versus "fails to pass threshold". In this manner, the value of P (H R | data) is not used for declaring 336 that a result is "real" based on a threshold, but as the amount of evidence on a continuum. There is no need for thresholds 337 and indeed one is encouraged not to use them -in the end they are arbitrary. Under the conventional paradigm, most 338 software implementations do not reveal to the analyst the results that fail to survive the hard threshold (e.g., 0.05). In 339 contrast, we propose a more fluid approach to categorizing statistical evidence: (1) one does not have to adopt a rigid 340 threshold, especially when supporting information exists in the literature; (2) reporting the full results helps portray the 341 entire spectrum of evidence.
342
An additional benefit of the Bayesian framework is that it provides direct interpretations of statistical evidence on 343 the effects themselves. To see the difference between this and the NHST case, consider the representative distributions in of the data and model fit. The inference hinges on the statistic value (gray box) relative to the null distribution. These properties can be compared and contrasted with the statistical inference under the Bayesian framework (Fig. 5, right) . 350 Here, the focus is directly on the effect (e.g., activation) in its original scale with a non-standard distribution conditioning 351 on data, model and priors.
352
Within the traditional NHST framework, one can consider confidence intervals. The use of confidence intervals, however, 353 tends to be plagued by conceptual misunderstanding and even more experienced researchers appear to struggle with its 354 proper interpretation (Morey et al., 2016). For example, one may easily confuse a parameter with its estimator under 355 the conventional statistical framework: a parameter (e.g., population mean) is considered a constant or a fixed effect 356 (without uncertainty) while its estimator (e.g., sample mean) constructed with sampling data is treated as a random 357 variable (with uncertainty). One can assign a distribution to the estimator, but one cannot do so for the corresponding 358 parameter, even if a one-to-one correspondence can be established between the confidence interval of the parameter and 359 an acceptance/rejection region for an estimator of the parameter; this is an all-too-common misconception under NHST.
360
In comparison, all parameters are considered random under the Bayesian framework, and the quantile intervals for a 361 parameter are more directly associated with the corresponding posterior density.
362

Limitations of NHST applications in neuroimaging 363
Much has been written about NHST over the past few decades. Here, we briefly enumerate a few aspects that are 364 relevant in the present context.
365
(1) Vulnerability to misconception. Defined as P (data | H 0 ), the p-value under NHST measures the extent of 366 "surprise" under the assumption of null effect H 0 (Fig. 5, left) . In contrast, an investigator is likely to be more interested in 367 a different measure, P (H R | data), the probability of a research hypothesis H R (e.g., a positive or negative effect) given the 368 data ( Fig. 5, right) , which is conceptually different from, but often mistakenly construed as, the p-value. The disconnect 369 between the p-value and the probability of research interest often leads to conceptual confusion (Nuzzo, 2014).
370
(2) Arbitrariness due to dichotomization. As the underlying physiological or neurological effect is in all likelihood 371 intrinsically continuous, the introduction of arbitrary demarcation through hard thresholding results in both information 372 loss and distortion. Due to the common practice of NHST and the adoption of significance level as a publication-filtering 373 criterion, a statistically non-significant result is often misinterpreted as a non-existent effect (the absence of evidence is 374 equated with the evidence of absence). The typical implementations in neuroimaging would not allow the user to have 375 the chance to visualize any clusters that are deemed to be below the preset threshold per the currently adopted correction 376 methods; in addition, false negative errors under NHST are largely ignored in the whole decision process regardless of 377 auxiliary information such as the literature and homologous regions between the two hemispheres. Indeed, although even 378 fairly introductory students of statistics will explicitly be aware of this problem, in experimental literature, the practice of 379 describing non-significant results as non-existent effects is puzzlingly widespread.
380
Hard thresholding leads to conceptual issues such as the following one: Is the difference between a statistically significant 381 result and a non-significant one itself statistically significant (Fig. 6) ? Translated into the neuroimaging context, when 382 blobs of spatial units are relatively near but below the adopted threshold (given the cluster size or the integration of cluster 383 size and statistical evidence), available software implementations hide them from the investigator (they are left uncolored, 384 much like a location inside a ventricle). Should those "activation blobs" really be considered as totally devoid of evidence?
385
(3) Arbitrariness due to model space. When the whole-brain voxel-wise analysis fails to reveal the expected regions researchers are prepared to publicly describe their work as "purely exploratory" at that point. Essentially, the vulnerability 391 to model space manipulations is a byproduct from the current adjustment criterion adopted for handling multiplicity. N (m1, σ 2 1 ) (blue) and N (m2, σ 2 2 ) (red), respectively, where m1 = 0.2, σ1 = 0.1, m2 = 0.4, σ2 = 0.3. Under NHST the first effect would be considered statistically significant with a one-sided (or two-sided) p-value of 0.023 (or 0.045); in contrast, the second effect would not be viewed statistically significant given a one-sided (or two-sided) p-value of 0.091 (or 0.18). On the other hand, the difference between the two effects is not statistically significant with a one-sided p-value of 0.26; in fact, the second effect is more likely larger than the first one with a probability of 0.74. four out of ten such studies, the impact of dichotomization on meta analysis could also be substantial. We believe that 400 the reporting of results and publication acceptance should not be based on a dichotomous decision rule in terms of a 401 predetermined statistical significance level (e.g., 0.05). property, the effect estimate is considered trustworthy while the corresponding statistic (e.g., t-value) and the associated 408 uncertainty (standard error or confidence interval) are frequently not directly interpretable at the spatial unit level because 409 of the extra step required to adjust for multiple testing. On the other hand, due to this lack of interpretability, one cannot 410 take at face value the reported maps with color-coded statistical evidence or the cluster tables with statistical values at 411 peak voxels. In fact, each spatial clique goes through a binary process of either passing or failing the surviving criterion 412 (e.g., either below or above the FPR of 0.05); accordingly, no specific uncertainty can be assigned to the effect at the spatial 413 unit (or peak voxel) level.
414
(6) Lack of spatial specificity. Whereas the conventional massively univariate approach attempts to determine 415 statistical evidence at each spatial unit, the procedures to handle multiple testing render statistical inference viable only 416 at the clusters level. Surviving clusters have different spatial extents, and in practice one may observe some that are quite 417 large. As the unit of statistical inference is the entire cluster, the investigator loses the ability to refer to individual voxels, 418 as shown in the common practice of locating a region via its "peak" voxel. In other words, when a cluster spans a few 419 anatomical regions, spatial specificity may be compromised as the investigator typically identifies only one region in which 420 the "peak" voxel resides. 421 (7) Penalizing intrinsically small regions. Compared to the excessive Bonferroni correction, neighborhood-422 leveraging procedures offer a relatively effective approach at handling multiplicity. However, the conventional massively 423 univariate approach inefficiently models each individual spatial unit separately, and the compensation for the incurred 424 multiplicity cannot fully recover the lost efficiency, resulting in loss of statistical power as the process attempts to achieve 425 nominal FPR levels. The combination of statistical evidence and spatial extent adopted in recent permutation-based 426 methods (Smith and Nichols, 2009; Cox, 2019) provides a principled approach to address the arbitrariness of primary 427 thresholding, but the approach still discriminates against spatially small regions. For example, between two brain regions 428 with comparable statistical strength, the anatomically larger one would be more likely to survive; and between a scenario 429 involving an isolated region and another with two or more contiguous regions, the former may fail to survive the current 430 filtering methods even when locally exhibiting stronger statistical strength.
431
Variations of FDR correction have been developed over the years to handle spatial relatedness in the brain (e.g., Leek 432 and Storey, 2008). However, FDR as an adjustment method for multiplicity shares the same issues as the FWE approach 433 (noted above). For example, when effects are not likely to be truly zero, or when the distinction between zero and non-zero 434 is blurry, the FDR control of "false discovery" (zero effect) shares the same logic as the NHST framework, which is based 435 on the idea of a binary distinction between "true" and "false" effects (instead of graded effect magnitudes). Additionally, 436 it is also a separate criterion applied to "fix" the overall results, rather than a coherent strategy, such as the single BML The vertical blue line indicates zero effect; orange and green tails mark the regions beyond the 90% and 95% uncertainty (compatibility or quantile) intervals, respectively. If results highlighting is desirable, one can claim the regions with strong evidence of slope effect as the blue line being within the color tails, as indicated with orange and green dot-dashed boxes. Compared to the conventional confidence interval that is flat and inconvenient to interpret, the posterior density provides much richer information about each effect such as spread, shape and skewness. Relative to the conventional whole-brain voxel-wise analysis that rendered with only two surviving clusters (Xiao et al., 2019) based on the primary voxel-wise p-value threshold of 0.001, the BML showed a much higher inference efficiency with 8 regions that could be highlighted with strong evidence. To illustrate the conventional dichotomization pitfall through a common practice of thresholding at 0.05, the region of L SFG also elicited some extent of slope effect with a moderate amount of statistical evidence: the probability that its effect is greater than zero is about 0.93 conditional on the data and the BML model.
Reprinted from Chen et al. (2019b). BML (B) . The subfigures A and B show the posterior predictive density overlaid with the raw data from the 124 subjects at the 21 ROIs for GLM and BML, respectively: solid black curve is the raw data at the 21 ROIs with linear interpolation while the fat curve in light blue is composed of 500 sub-curves each of which corresponds to one draw from the posterior distribution based on the respective model. The differences between the solid black and light blue curves indicate how well the respective model fits the raw data. BML fitted the data clearly better than GLM at the peak and both tails as well as the skewness because pooling the data from both ends toward the center through shrinkage clearly validates our adoption of BML. To make performance comparisons possible, the conventional univariate GLM was Bayesianized with a noninformative prior (i.e., uniform distribution on (−∞, +∞)) for the regions. Figure 10 : Characterizing the inter-region correlation structure of group brain data. A) Correlations between two pairs of brain regions, rij, are not independent when they share a common region. Thus, when simultaneously estimating multiple correlations, such relatedness needs to be modeled and accounted for. B) Making inferences about correlations leads to a multiplicity problem, in particular how to account for the simultaneous inferences of all effects under NHST. In a Bayesian framework, multiplicity relates to the problem of modeling all correlations simultaneously by invoking information sharing or partial pooling. C) Within a Bayesian multilevel framework, it is possible to frame the problem in terms of capturing the population-level effect of (1) brain region, Rq, (2) region pair, rij, and (3) subject k. The characterization of the effect of brain regions is a unique contribution of our framework, which allows investigators to reveal a region's "importance" within a principled statistical framework. Reprinted from Chen et al. Figure 11 : Posterior density plots of region effects (in Fisher's z-value). Each posterior distribution indicates the probability of observing region effects. The orange and green tails mark areas outside the two-sided 90% and 95% quantile intervals, respectively; the blue vertical lines indicate the zero region effect. Consider a region such as the BNST_L (top row, third column): the zero region effect lies in the left green area, indicating that the probability that the effect is positive is greater or equal to 0.975 (conversely, the probability that the effect is negative is ≤ 0.025). The same is true for the Thal_R (second row, second column). In these two cases, there is strong statistical evidence of a region effect, as indicated with green dot-dashed boxes. Two other regions (BNST_R and Thal_L; orange dot-dashed boxes) exhibited moderate statistical evidence of a region effect (the blue vertical lines were each within the orange band). Four more regions forming contralateral pairs of regions (BF_L and BF_R, aIns_L and aIns_R) plus SMA_R also exhibited some statistical evidence as they were close to the typical "convenience" thresholds. Note that the posterior density provides rich information about each effect distribution, including shape, spread and skewness. Unlike the conventional confidence interval that is flat and inconvenient to interpret, it is valid to state that, conditional on the data and model, with probability, say, 95%, the region effect lies in its 95% posterior interval. Inferences about region pairs are shown in Thal_L  Thal_R  aIns_L  aIns_R  IPG_L  IPG_R  MPFC_L  MPFC_R  mIns_R  pIFG_L  pIFG_R  SMA_R   BF_L  BF_R  BNST_L  BNST_R  Thal_L  Thal_R  aIns_L  aIns_R  IPG_L  IPG_R  MPFC_L  MPFC_R  mIns_R Thal_L  Thal_R  aIns_L  aIns_R  IPG_L  IPG_R  MPFC_L  MPFC_R  mIns_R  pIFG_L  pIFG_R  SMA_R   BF_L  BF_R  BNST_L  BNST_R  Thal_L  Thal_R  aIns_L  aIns_R  IPG_L  IPG_R  MPFC_L  MPFC_R mIns_R pIFG_L pIFG_R SMA_R as likely to be 0.1% as 100% signal change). In contrast, random effects capture intrinsic variations observed in inherently 554 random samples. The inclusion of random effects in the model makes inference generalization possible at the population 555 level, and the uncertainty associated with random-effects variables is treated as aleatoric, reflecting the elusive nature of 556 fluctuations among measuring entities (e.g., subjects). Under the conventional modeling framework, random effects are 557 generally of no interest (e.g., residuals in GLM and subject-specific effects under LME) but are included in the model to 558 account for data variability and to allow generalizations from the current sample to a hypothetical population.
559
However, such a distinction between random and fixed effects is dissolved under BML by treating all effects as random.
560
For example, the effect of interest at each region can be viewed as a varying quantity relative to a collectioin of background 561 information across all regions; that is, by treating the effects among brain regions as the outcome of a "subjective" Gaussian 562 distribution, we no longer need the distinction of fixed versus random effects. Specifically, by leveraging the global as- about anything unknown should be expressed by a probability distribution.
584
A little more technically, the move away from assuming epistemic uncertainties ("fixed but unknown") allows us first 585 to incorporate spatial units as levels of a factor into LME modeling, and then to transition from LME to BML (for 586 technical details, see Chen et al., 2019b). Without operating within the BML framework, the individual spatial units 587 would be typically treated as independent entities (isolated locations) and modeled in parallel under the massively univariate 588 modeling. Consider the example of inferring an effect at each region pair with matrix data. In a traditional LME model 589 each region pair is treated as a random effect, and no inference can be made about individual regions and region pairs other 590 than the intercept (common effect shared by all regions and all subjects), which is typically not very informative in practice.
591
In contrast, within the BML framework, the effect of each region pair is modeled as the contribution of each involved region 592 plus their interaction. In doing so, we can derive both the individual effects and their combined contribution as a pair by 593 sampling from the posterior joint distribution (Chen et al., 2019c). Thus, the distinction between fixed-and random-effects prior only stipulates the distribution shape, and its specific parameters are actually determined a posteriori through the model conditioning on the data. In contrast, the uniform distribution implicitly assumed under the conventional massively univariate framework, as a special case of BML, is usually not examined or verified in real practice. As experimentalists, we generally have prior knowledge about an effect of interest (e.g., a BOLD percent change of 100% is unrealistic for viewed as carrying categorical information ("active" vs. "not active"). There has been a recent call for the distinction one with a more discernible peak) than more complex prior distributions (Jefferys and Berger, 1992). Nevertheless, it of Mental Health (R01 MH071589 and R01 MH112517).
